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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
to file a supplemental bill upon the receipt of complete information.59
Some courts, however, have allowed service of a supplemental bill, as
of right, within a specified time before trial.60
In Watrous v. Harris,6 ' the Supreme Court, Albany County, fol-
lowed the great weight of authority, requiring the plaintiff to state his
lack of knowledge under oath and to seek leave to serve a supplemental
bill.62 This procedure permits the court to examine the merits of such
a request at the time the information is available.6
ARTICLE 31 - DISCLOSURE
CPLR 3101: Restrictions on pretrial disclosure in matrimonial actions
deemed obsolete.
While the Third64 and Fourth 5 Departments permit pretrial dis-
closure of financial matters in matrimonial actions, the First66 and
Second 6r Departments deny such disclosure in contested cases68 in the
6 See, e.g., In re May's Will, 17 App. Div. 2d 729, 232 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1st Dep't 1962)
(mem.); Rotondi v. Vaughan, 28 Misc. 2d 656, 220 N.Y.S.2d 213 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1961); Guilizio v. Rios, 14 Misc. 2d 513, 184 N.Y.S.2d 205 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1958);
McGrath v. Calabrese, 13 Misc. 2d 267, 176 N.Y.S.2d 431 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1958).
6o See Schondorf v. Stein-Tex, Inc., 28 App. Div. 2d 835, 281 N.Y.S.2d 630 (1st Dep't
1967); Rico v. Pierleoni, 33 Misc. 2d 955, 226 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1962)
(allowing reservation of right to issue supplemental bill to be served at least ten days
before trial and limited to recital of further medical expenses for known injuries);
Lesser v. Kennedy, 19 Misc. 2d 812, 193 N.Y.S.2d 63 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1959).
6171 Misc. 2d 63, 335 N.Y.S.2d 553 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1972).
62 Accord, In re May's Will, 17 App. Div. 2d 729, 232 N.Y.S.2d 39 (Ist Dep't 1962)
(mem.); Force v. Tracy Towing Lines, Inc., 190 Misc. 446, 74 N.Y.S.2d 454 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1947).
63 Cf. McLaughlin, New York Trial Practice, 168 N.Y.L.J. 90, Nov. 10, 1972, at 3,
col. 3:
While it is eminently sensible to prevent the plaintiff from stating in his bill of
particulars that he reserves the right to prove other injuries at trial, would it not
be "better practice" to permit the plaintiff to serve a supplemental bill of partic-
ulars, as of right, before trial?
64 See Plohn v. Plohn, 281 App. Div. 1056, 121 N.YS.2d 336 (3d Dep't 1953) (mem.);
Berlin v. Berlin, 17 Misc. 2d 768, 187 N.Y.S.2d 553 (Sup. Ct. Broome County 1959).
65 See Dunlap v. Dunlap, 34 App. Div. 2d 889, 312 N.Y.S.2d 441 (4th Dep't 1970)
(mem.), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 45 ST. JonN's L. REV. 500, 519 (1971) (dis-
closure of all relevant matters).
66 See Stern v. Stern, 39 App. Div. 2d 87, 332 N.Y.S.2d 334 (Ist Dep't 1972).
67See Plancher v. Plancher, 35 App. Div. 2d 417, 422, 317 N.Y.S.2d 140, 145 (2d
Dep't 1970), aff'd mem., 29 N.Y.2d 880, 278 N.E.2d 650, 328 N.Y.S.2d 444 (1972); Camp-
bell v. Campbell, 7 App. Div. 2d 1011, 184 N.YS.2d 479 (2d Dep't 1959) (mem.). "Actu-
ally, the Second Department's rule is substantially encroached by treating a formally
'contested' matter as 'uncontested' if it is not 'seriously' contested." Schaeffer v. Schaeffer,
70 Misc. 2d 1033, 1036, 335 N.Y.S.2d 510, 513 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1972), citing
Plancher v. Plancher, supra.
68 The First and Second Departments allow pretrial disclosure of financial matters in
uncontested matrimonial actions in the absence of a showing of special circumstances
warranting denial. See Stern v. Stern, 39 App. Div. 2d 87, 332 N.Y.S.2d 334 (Ist Dep't
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absence of special circumstances, on the theory that it would hinder
reconciliation.6" In Schaeffer v. Schaeffer,70 the Supreme Court, Nassau
County, recently departed from the restrictive Second Department ap-
proach.
In Schaeffer, a wife in a separation action, wherein her husband
counterclaimed for divorce, sought pretrial disclosure of his financial
affairs. The court directed the husband to answer interrogatories with-
out finding special circumstances.7 Viewing the restrictive precedents
as obsolete in light of current reconciliation procedures72 and the
modem attitude toward divorce, 73 the court applied the same disclosure
rules as apply in non-matrimonial actions.74 The court noted that
restrictions on pretrial disclosure of financial affairs give the husband
an unfair advantage in what is frequently the most important aspect of
divorce litigation3 5 Since the special circumstances requirement ap-
plies only in contested divorce actions, the court also reasoned that a
husband is encouraged to contest a divorce in order to avoid the neces-
sity of making disclosure. This, the court observed, may cause addi-
tional friction between the parties, thus lessening the chances for
reconciliation. 7
It is unlikely that liberal disclosure of financial matters in matri-
monial actions will thwart many potential reconciliations. As the court
noted in Schaeffer, only a small percentage of couples are reconciled
after divorce litigation begins. 77 Ample opportunity for reconciliation
is presently available. More importantly, the Schaeffer decision is con-
sistent with the CPLR's policy of avoiding unfair disadvantage through
full disclosure of all evidence "material and necessary." 78
1972); Plancher v. Plancher, 35 App. Div. 2d 417, 317 N.Y.S.2d 140 (2d Dep't 1970), aff'd
mem., 29 N.Y.2d 880, 278 N.E.2d 650, 328 N.Y.S.2d 444 (1972); Campbell v. Campbell, 7
App. Div. 2d 1011, 184 N.Y.S.2d 479 (2d Dep't 1959) (mem.).
69 Pretrial examination has been characterized as an "exacerbating circumstance"
in matrimonial actions. Hunter v. Hunter, 10 App. Div. 2d 291, 294, 198 N.Y.S.2d 1008,
1012 (Ist Dep't 1960).
70 70 Misc 2d 1099, 35 N.Y.S.2d 510 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1972).
71 ld. at 1037, 35 N.Y.S.2d at 514.
72DRL art. 11-B.
73E.g., Gleason v. Gleason, 26 N.Y.2d 28, 256 N.E.2d 513, 908 N.Y.S.2d 347 (1970).
74 Accordingly, the wife in this case is entitled to pretrial discovery, although,
like any pretrial disclosure procedure, the interrogatories must seek information
that is material, pertinent and not already disclosed by the party to be questioned.
70 Misc. 2d at 1038, 995 N.Y.S.2d at 515. A protective order under CPLR 9103 is avail-
able to prevent an abuse of the right to disclosure.
75 70 Misc. 2d at 1037-S8, 335 N.YS.2d at 514-15.
76 Id. at 1037, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 514.
77 Id.
78 CPLR 9101.
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